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Abstract 
 
The concept of organizational routine can foster our understanding of the behaviour of 
organizations and of organizational change (Nelson and Winter 1982, March and Simon 1958, 
Cyert and March 1963), but since empirical studies employing organizational routines as 
analytical perspective are still relatively rare, how to conduct such an analysis and what are its 
benefits is not yet fully evident. We wish to shed light on how employing routines contributes 
to understanding the behavior of organizations and to demonstrate the potential of such 
analysis. The empirical analysis of the product development process at an engineering centre 
shows that using organizational routines presents advantages over alternative analytical 
approaches. The paper also contributes to shed light on how to fruitfully employ an 
organizational routines perspective in analysing the behaviour of organizations, providing the 
foundation for further empirical work. 
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Applying Organizational Routines in Analyzing the Behavior of Organizations  
 
1. Introduction1 
 
Understanding the behavior and change of organizations was one of the key motivations in 
introducing the concept of organizational routines (Simon 1947, March and Simon 1958, 
Cyert and March 1963, Nelson and Winter 1982). More recently, organizational routines have 
also been posited as a useful focus in analyzing how work is carried out in organizations 
(Hutchins 1991, Pentland 1995, Orlikowski 2000, Barley and Kunda 2001, Pentland 2003a 
and 2003b) and in showing how organizations change their operations (Feldman 2000, 
Feldman and Pentland 2003, Winter and Szulanski 2001, Zollo and Winter 2002). Other 
theoretical frameworks and approaches to empirical analysis of organizational behavior and 
change do, of course, exist, so why choose organizational routines as analytical perspective?  
 
To start with, routines are ubiquitous in organizations (see the empirical literature reviewed in 
Becker 2004), as well as an integral part of their daily operation. A large part of the work 
carried out in organizations is accomplished in routinized ways. Thus, its routines can be 
considered ‘typical’ for an organization. In order to understand an organization and its 
behavior, analysing its routines thus seems an appropriate starting point since they capture 
systematic and endogenous (rather than exogenous or one-off) performance drivers. 
Moreover, routines play an important role in organizational learning and memory, and 
contribute to efficiency induced by such learning (Argote and Epple 1990). Accordingly, 
                                                
1
 Authors’ names are in alphabetical order because they have contributed to the paper equally. For purposes of 
formal assignment, Markus Becker wrote section 2. Francesco Zirpoli wrote section 3. Section 1, 4, 5 and 6 were 
written jointly. We are grateful to Thorbjørn Knudsen, two anonymous referees, and participants of the 2005 
Academy of Management Meetings and the 2nd International Routines Conference, Nice 2005, for helpful 
comments and discussion of preceding versions of this paper, and to Pasquale Salvatore for research assistance. 
All remaining errors and omissions are our own responsibility. 
Page 4 of 37
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
  
 4 
using organizational routines means to be able to capture knowledge- and learning-related 
aspects and their effects.  
 
The potential of organizational routines as analytical perspective has not yet been fully 
unlocked. Empirical studies of organizations focused on routines are still relatively rare (for 
some examples, see Cohen and Bacdayan 1994, Pentland and Rueter 1994, Knott and 
McKelvey 1999, Edmondson et al. 2001, Feldman 2000 and 2003, Narduzzo et al. 2000, 
Szulanski and Winter 2002, Winter and Szulanski 2001). Furthermore, the question of how to 
operationalize organizational routines has turned out to be more than trivial, making the task 
more difficult (recently, a number of papers on the topic have been published; see Pentland 
2003a and 2003b, Becker et al. 2005 and the articles in the special section of Industrial and 
Corporate Change 2005, 14.5). Finally, precisely what the benefits are from such an analysis 
is yet not fully evident, mainly due to a lack of empirical studies.  
 
 While previous empirical studies employing an organizational routines approach have tackled 
specific research questions about organizations, we explore how using the analytical 
perspective of organizational routines contributes to understanding the behaviour of 
organizations and show how to carry out such an analysis, thus closing a gap in the literature. 
The paper is structured as follows. It first briefly introduces the notion of organizational 
routines. The case study is presented in section three. Section four explores the contribution of 
organizational routines in explaining the behavior of organizations, thus answering the 
research question. Section five presents conclusions.  
 
2. Organizational routines 
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Three definitions of organizational routines can be found in the literature: (i) behavior patterns 
(recurrent interaction patterns), (ii) rules (standard operating procedures, heuristics, etc.), and 
(iii) dispositions. 
(i) Currently, most scholars think of organizational routines as repeated behavior 
patterns for accomplishing tasks. For example, consider the task of taking an order by phone, 
which is often accomplished by using a particular sequence of phrases in a phone 
conversation between a call center agent and a customer (Pentland and Rueter 1994). It has 
now become standard practice to use the term ‘routines’ for collective (multi-person) and the 
term ‘habits’ for individual (single-person) behavior patterns (Dosi et al. 2000). The term 
‘recurrent interaction patterns’ provides a more precise term for referring to stability on the 
level of behavior that involves multiple actors.  
(ii) Viewing organizational routines as rules (standard operating procedures), on the 
other hand, captures a different phenomenon. At least implicitly, rules and standard operating 
procedures (such as codified ‘best practices’ and process handbooks like McDonald’s 
processes for providing fast food; Leidner 1993) give rise to recurrent interaction patterns. 
Note that rules do not necessarily, however, fully specify the causal mechanism, that is, 
precisely how rules contribute to generating recurrent patterns of behavior. As Feldman and 
Pentland (2003) have recently argued, the role of human agency in rule-following, and 
probably also the governance mechanisms that provide incentives and constraints for 
following rules would at least need to be considered. 
(iii) Some recent articles argue that organizational routines should be understood as 
dispositions to engage in previously adopted or acquired behavior, triggered by an appropriate 
stimulus or context (Hodgson and Knudsen 2004a and 2004b). Rather than patterns of 
behavior, routines are ‘stored behavioral capacities or capabilities. These capacities involve 
knowledge and memory. They involve organisational structures and individual habits which, 
when triggered, lead to sequential behaviors’ (Hodgson and Knudsen 2004a, 9). Routines are 
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therefore repertoires of potential behavior that can be triggered (Hodgson 2004, 652), such as 
the capacity to take and process an order from a customer in a call center. 
 
In our analysis, we use these different definitions as follows. First, since our interest is in 
understanding the behavior of organizations, a description of the manifest behavior is 
required. Repeated behavior patterns, as in definition (i), are important because processes as 
they are actually carried out directly generate performance implications (Penrose 1959). For 
these reasons, ‘recurrent interaction patterns’ should be part of the analysis. Second, 
describing only the ‘surface’ level of manifest behavior does not, however, reveal the causes 
for certain behaviors in organizations. For understanding the behavior of organizations, 
capturing the causes obviously is important as well. Martha Feldman and Brian Pentland 
recently proposed a framework that draws together the two most commonly used definitions 
(routines-as-behaviour [recurrent interaction patterns] and routines-as-rules [standard 
operating procedures]). They distinguish the ‘ostensive aspect’ of a routine, referring to 
abstract, cognitive regularities and expectations that enable participants to guide, account for, 
and refer to specific performances of a routine, and its ‘performative aspect’, which refers to 
actual performances by specific eople at specific times and in specific places. The standard 
operating procedures repres nt the ‘ostensive aspect’ of a routine, and the recurrent 
interaction patterns that implements them is the ‘performative aspect’. Importantly, between 
the two lies human agency. Human agents interpret, ignore, or adapt rules, for instance, and 
give a particular stamp to the recurrent behavior patterns to be observed. They also contribute 
to transforming organizational routines slowly by adapting the performative to the ostensive 
and vice versa. What concerns us here is that both levels of analysis are required because, as 
Feldman and Pentland argue, their interplay matters. The third definition, dispositions, is the 
most recent one. We are not aware of any empirical studies in the management literature that 
have begun to identify dispositions, and empirical methodology has not yet been discussed in 
Page 7 of 37
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
  
 7 
management research.2 For this reason, and because of the arguments just described for 
focusing on the other two levels, we start our description there, and later consider the level of 
dispositions after having completed the description.  
 
3. The case study 
 
3.1 Method  
 
Current literature shows that existing research does not fully address how organizational 
routines can be operationalized so that they can contribute to the understanding of 
organizational behaviour through empirical studies. In this respect, we intend to offer both an 
empirical and an analytical contribution. These goals, the nature of the research question and 
of the gaps we found in the literature led us to choose the case study methodology (Eisenhardt 
1989, Pettigrew 1990, Yin 1994, Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). Since we are interested in 
both rules and standard operating procedures, and recurrent interaction patterns, we need data-
gathering methods able to capture both. While standard operating procedures and eventually 
the gap between the firm’s realized and expected performances could be traced using 
documental and archival sources, in order to identify the recurrent interaction patterns, 
observation and in-depth interviews were the only possible options available. No method 
other than case studies can gather the qualitative data necessary to study both aspects of 
organizational routines. 
 
The empirical material presented in this paper was collected at a European research centre 
specializing in automobile design. It was established as a ‘green field’ research centre close to 
a plant of a major European car maker in 1988 and today has around 750 employees, mostly 
                                                
2
 There is, however, a stream of empirical research on dispositions in psychology. For a pointers to that literature 
see Knudsen (2008).  
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engineers. Our field study involved employees responsible for the development of vehicle 
engineering (in particular all the mechanical systems except for the style).  
 
Three data collection methods were used: (1) Archival sources (about 2000 pages of company 
official documents [norms and procedures] were analyzed); (2) Extensive semi- structured 
interviews (the authors carried out more than 60 hours of interviews, both to explore and to 
get a deeper understanding of particular issues; these interviews involved the head of the 
vehicle department, the head of project management for vehicle department, the vehicle 
development function manager, the head of human resources, the chief engineer of 
‘packaging’ (the ‘packaging’ task will be explained in the following section), one ‘packaging’ 
team leader, three ‘packaging’ team members and the head of ‘project SUV’; (3) one 
researcher spent 10 months working at the research centre; during this time, he regularly took 
part in meetings, participated in some of the tasks, provided support, and so on. In order to 
increase the consistency of our data, we decided to focus our interviews and direct 
observations on one project. For confidentiality, we cannot use the real acronym of the 
project, so we have named it ‘project SUV’. The project was the most important one the 
research centre was carrying out during the observation.  
 
The method was designed to observe the same units of analysis from different angles, 
confirming the reliability of the data when they were consistent and inducing a new round of 
interviews when inconsistent. The comparison of quantitative and qualitative data, and the 
fact that managers from different departments and functions were interviewed using the same 
unit of analysis, made triangulation possible and extremely effective. Due to the intrinsic 
limitations of case study research (Miles and Huberman 1994), the sample could be partially 
biased by the fact that only one project has been observed, which could represent a limit to the 
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generalizability of the findings despite the fact managers interviewed confirmed that the 
project chosen was highly representative of their usual projects. 
 
3.2 The task selected for observation: packaging 
 
To analyze organizational routines, first, we must select a task in order to analyze how it is 
accomplished by the organization. Following from the definition of a routine, it should be a 
task that is recurrent, repeatedly accomplished in ‘the same’ (or very similar) way. For 
purposes of observation, it would also be helpful if the frequency would be high rather than 
low so that numerous observations can be collected in a reasonable time frame. Furthermore, 
the task should be closely linked to the organization’s objectives in order to avoid sampling 
outliers such as activities that take place ‘at work’ but are not primarily concerned with 
accomplishing the organization’s objectives. 
Next, we must select the level of granularity at which to describe how tasks are 
accomplished, and this choice can present a problem. If the task chosen is too ‘large’ (macro, 
high-level), then the description will be very generic and complex, making it difficult to 
analyze and to draw conclusions as, for example, when one analyzes the entire process of 
achieving the principal task of the organization (such as ‘produce and market high-quality 
cars for the upper market segment’). If the task chosen is too ‘micro’, such as how to push 
keys on the keyboard while writing a marketing plan, the object of the analysis becomes 
meaningless, and the analysis itself might thus become meaningless as well. In either case, the 
risk is high that a detailed description of the process will be of little use in understanding how 
accomplishing the task will lead to a certain level of performance.  
Fortunately, the concept of organizational routines provides guidance to the 
appropriate level of granularity as an intrinsic part of it. First, organizational routines refer to 
the collective level (such as group or team), not the individual level, which is covered by the 
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concept ‘habit’ (Dosi et al. 2000).  The analyst should thus select tasks that require task-
related interaction and exclude individual habits that do not contribute to accomplishing 
organizational tasks (at least not immediately). Second, the organizational routine concept 
provides guidance to which tasks are very important for the organization; the qualifier 
‘organizational’ in ‘organizational routines’ indicates which routines are important with 
regard to this question. As is well-known, the organization literature considers 
interdependence as the key problem that organization addresses (Thompson 1967), and 
coordinating interdependencies is a fundamental task of every organization. If organizational 
routines capture the behavior of an organization, they should therefore also play a role in 
interdependencies (for instance, by providing coordination of how interdependent tasks are 
accomplished).  
Different kinds of interdependencies between tasks can be distinguished. Thompson 
distinguishes generic, sequential, and reciprocal interdependence. Reciprocal interdependence 
is the strongest type, posing the most difficult coordination challenges, so focusing on 
routines an organization uses to accomplish a reciprocally interdependent task offers a very 
good chance of describing something that is meaningful to the organization. The criterion 
provided by the concept of organizational routine is thus to select processes that implement 
reciprocally interdependent tasks. 
 
Given these criteria, we chose a task called ‘packaging’3. In the course of a new product 
development project, packaging refers to checking whether individual components actually fit 
together when assembled in their final positions. For example, imagine all the elements of an 
                                                
3
 As far as sampling is concerned, we were looking for an organizational task that was ‘…very special in the 
sense of allowing one to gain certain insights that other organizations would not be able to provide’ (Siggelkow 
2007, p. 20). For this reason we employed theoretical sampling. This sampling approach reflects the fact that 
‘cases are selected because they are particularly suitable for illuminating and extending relationships and logic 
among constructs’ (Eisenhardt and Graebner, p. 27) and that our research does not intend to perform theory 
testing (Eisenhardt and Graebner). As Eisenhardt and Graebner state ‘single-case research typically exploits 
opportunities to explore a significant phenomenon under rare or extreme circumstances’ (p. 27). We believe our 
sampling choice reflects this opportunity.  
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engine; packaging would check whether the proposed engine could actually fit in the available 
space under the hood (see figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Example of virtual packaging 
 
In the packaging check, particular attention is on such details as minimal distances between 
components to assure they do not touch even at high speed or on rugged surfaces, resulting in 
noise and possibly damage of components. Packaging therefore contributes in a major way to 
a core objective of the organization and its product development activity: to assure a high 
quality standard for the product. Packaging also qualifies as a core task, its purpose being to 
eradicate sources of product failure that can generate negative customer reactions of very high 
impact (such as recall of car models from the market). The budget devoted to packaging 
makes up 5 to 10% of the overall budget of the development of a new car model at this 
engineering centre, making it one of the most costly activities in the development of the car 
model. Twenty employees are dedicated to the packaging activity on a permanent and full-
time basis, constituting a team of an important dimension. Furthermore, packaging is an on-
going activity during almost the whole development project, and most importantly, the 
packaging task is almost the paradigmatic example of a reciprocally interdependent task (our 
main criterion above). Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the highly reciprocal, 
technical interdependence: the objective of the packaging task is to optimize the technical 
performance of the overall system by ensuring that interactions between different 
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combinations of components conform to technical specifications. As explained in more detail 
below (see figure 2), such reciprocal interdependence on the technical level is also reflected 
on the organizational level: carrying out the full packaging check requires coordinating 26 
engineering teams who develop the components and sub-systems in parallel and whose 
possibilities and constraints in doing so depend on the decisions taken in the other teams.  
 
‘Virtual packaging checks’ (see below) are performed on a bi-weekly basis during the entire 
life of the development project, from concept development to the industrialization phase. 
Thus, the packaging activity recurs at least 48 times during a project (and 20 times during our 
10 months observation). When our observations started, the project had run for two years and 
had been overseen by the packaging team from the start of the project. Since the people 
staffed to the team had previous experiences in packaging activities for other projects, their 
performance is not idiosyncratic to the projects under observation. In fact, the packaging tasks 
are governed by a set of company norms and procedures developed by the OEM that apply to 
all packaging activities performed in the firm. The key norm was established in 2003 by a 
dedicated team that included company experts for virtual tools. The team members we 
interviewed held the same positions in the company both during the period of observation and 
before, as regards their involvement in the “packaging” process. This stability was one of the 
keys to being able to observe the formation and role of organizational routines. 
 
The firm’s management confirmed that this task was an adequate object of observation since 
packaging is a typical activity for the engineering centre and tightly linked to its objectives. 
Packaging check results are important inputs for several stages in the new product 
development process. In many instances, a green light from packaging is a necessary 
condition before moving into the next phase of development. This fact illustrates the high 
reciprocal interdependence of the packaging task, and indicates how essential a part of the 
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development process it is. Most importantly, moreover, the objective of the packaging task is 
to coordinate the reciprocal interdependencies in the development of complex products. To 
benefit from the lever of concurrent engineering in component design, individual component 
development teams need to align and fine-tune their development work through many gates 
(checks). The kinds of checks run in packaging can include the following: 
• Checks of project objectives 
• Checks of absence of static and cinematic interferences, compliance with minimum 
distances 
• Functional and esthetical checks 
• Checks on safety and ease of maintenance  
• Ergonomic checks and checks of manufacturing ergonomy  
• Checks of manufacturability 
 
Figure 2 shows how development teams are divided into packaging for mechanics (engine, 
suspensions, etc.) and packaging for the chassis. For both mechanics and chassis packaging 
activities, two kinds of checks have to be performed: virtual checks and physical checks. In 
virtual checks, the individual components are described by CAD/CAM files stored in the 
Product Data Management system (PDM). These files then interact virtually by software that 
simulates their interaction (Digital Mock-Up, DMU). Virtual checks serve to check the 
feasibility and coherence of the designs early in the design process, either substituting for 
physical checks or complementing them. Note that the virtual prototype (Digitial Mock-Up, 
DMU) constitutes, over most of the development project, the reference point and the object on 
which development efforts focus. Physical checks are usually carried out late in the process 
and involve physical prototypes. In what follows we refer to activities carried out via DMU 
for the packaging of mechanics. As this section should have made clear, packaging is a 
paradigm example for a highly reciprocally interdependent task.  
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Figure 2: The structure of packaging 
 
 
3.3 Procedures regarding the packaging task 
 
Packaging activities are described comprehensively and thoroughly by a whole set of 
‘procedures’ (which in this firm refer to how to organize tasks) and ‘norms’ (setting 
technological standards, such as threshold values). Amongst others, the following selection of 
‘procedures’ and ‘norms’ are pertinent to packaging: 
 ‘Norm on the product development process’ 
 ‘Procedure of vehicle packaging’ 
 ‘Procedure on virtual checks via DMU’ 
 ‘Check-lists of virtual check via DMU: chassis, mechanics, manufacturability, 
ergonomics’ 
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 ‘Procedure on use of knowledge management system and use of CAD in the product 
development process’ 
 ‘Norm on the lay-out of drive-train and engine’ 
 
The list could be continued but illustrates that packaging is a highly ‘regulated’ activity in the 
sense that some very comprehensive and very precise instructions, some having close to 100 
pages, exist for how to carry out packaging.   
 
Briefly, to start the packaging process, the ‘raw material’ for the packaging calculations (we 
focus on virtual packaging checks), the CAD files of all the car’s components, are developed 
by development engineers grouped into 26 teams: chassis, drive-train, steering, and so on (see 
figure 2). The CAD files they produce are kept in a database that is called product data 
management system (PDM). Designing components often takes many months, considering 
adaptations required to accommodate changes in other components, so it is an on-going 
activity. Packaging is carried out by the packaging team, which consists of 20 employees who 
do nothing other than packaging. Once a packaging activity is triggered, they transfer the files 
that correspond to the components they are checking to another computer system (and file 
format) and use a DMU (Digital Mock-Up) virtual simulation software to run calculations that 
simulate interaction between the components to evaluate the effects in the various dimensions 
(ergonomy, etc.). All the performances listed above (manufacturability, space limits, etc.) 
produce a list of anomalies that specifies all instances in which the requirements were not 
met.4 One member of the packaging team then filters this list for anomalies that do not create 
practical problems or whose cause has already been eliminated, and all the heads of the 
different engineering units (engine, interiors, etc.) then meet to discuss the remaining 
anomalies. The anomalies list allows the packaging team and the engineers who are the 
                                                
4
 For every check to be carried out, there are lists of technical norms (threshold values such as minimum 
distances) as well as technical procedures for how to run the checks. 
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‘owners’ of the problem (i.e., the component that exhibits anomalies) to coordinate their 
efforts. The anomalies are also registered in the log-book, the official document used by the 
development platform to keep track of the project’s evolution, record and monitor the 
resolution of the anomalies as well as the technical solutions adopted, and enable team 
members to discuss potential modifications of the project’s objectives with the client.  
The packaging activity follows a cycle with a regular rhythm, described in the written 
procedures that prescribe fortnightly cycles of checks for most components (some follow 
weekly cycles, but the object we follow in this paper was subjected to bi-weekly cycles) 
(Figure 3).   
 
 
Figure 3: Flow chart of virtual check cycles 
 
3.4 Recurrent interaction patterns in packaging  
 
In this section, we first describe how the task is supposed to be carried out according to the 
procedures and norms and, subsequently, how it is carried out in practice. The description 
below follows the nine-step structure of packaging as described in the procedures. 
  
Step #1: Releasing the CAD files for use by the packaging team  
Bi-weekly virtual verification cycles 
Virtual verfication analysis and 
compilation of list of anomalies 
Day 1 of month Day 15 of month 
 
Discussion of list of anomalies within 
the packaging team;  
Registration of anomalies in log book 
and notification of team leaders 
concerned 
Evaluation of anomaly by  those 
responsible for the system 
Discussion of anomalies in 
fortnightly meetings and division of 
actions to be taken 
Discussion of feedback;  
generate updated parts and 
official release 
NEXT LOOP
4 
days
1 
day 
1 
day 
1 
day 
3 
days
~15 days (10 working days) 
~15 days (10 working days) 
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The procedures and norms prescribe that each engineer responsible for a component should 
release his or her CAD files periodically (for most components the rhythm is a fortnight). 
There are 26 teams of engineers, whose team leaders are responsible for making sure their 
team-members release the CAD files on time. Typically, the delivery deadline is set a day or 
two before the virtual check is run (some transformation of the data has to take place, as the 
CAD system and the system used for the virtual checks are different and files have to be 
transferred into another format).  
 
In reality, updated CAD files are often not delivered on time. This triggers quite an intense 
activity on part of the packaging team, who remind engineers to release their files. Two 
formal measures can be taken in case updated CAD files are not released to the packaging 
team on time, depending on the cause of the delay. In case of hardware or software problems, 
often the cause of delays, the problem is addressed by IT people (neither the engineers nor the 
packaging people are much involved) but if a delayed release is related to delays in the 
engineers’ activities, no particular action is taken. No authorization for not releasing the 
updated files is required; not even a notice of the late release or lack of release needs to be 
made. Since there are no such requirements, the updated CAD files are often released late or 
not at all without any notice, preceded by an intense reminder activity on part of the 
packaging team.  
 
Step #2: Creating a reference base of files for the packaging software 
The second step consists of creating a homogenous reference (in terms of the state of the 
design) for purposes of the packaging check. To do so, (i) a point of time of reference has to 
be defined to which the designs of all components will be compared. The CAD files of all 
components are then (ii) transformed into files in the format of the packaging software, which 
results, in simple terms, in a ‘snap shot’ of the whole vehicle at that moment. Packaging check 
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calculations will be run on this ‘object’. According to the procedures and norms, the person in 
charge of packaging should, after the point fixed as reference, download the CAD files from 
the product data management (PDM) system (where all CAD files are kept centrally), identify 
the CAD files that correspond to the components of the vehicle (there might be more than one 
file per component, and several components to realize an assembly), and then upload them 
into the DMU software. The procedures also contain a back-up procedure so that in case of 
late release, an override folder is created. By default, the system then automatically 
downloads all CAD files, picking the last available version previous to the point of reference. 
In reality, due to the late delivery of updated CAD files (i.e., so that only ‘old’ files, already 
used for the last cycle of the packaging check, are available in the product data management 
system), the process in step two already diverges from that specified for the procedure.  
Another divergence also arises in step two: ignoring the procedure on the override folder, no 
one on the team creates the override folder. In fact, in our interviews, all members of the 
packaging team told us they had never used it, some even saying they had not even heard of 
such a thing. Rather, the packaging check is simply run with the last available files (as 
identified automatically by the system). At the same time, the packaging team attempts, by 
way of informal communication with the engineering teams, to assess how serious the 
omissions and their consequences are (and whether the overall packaging check might be 
feasible without the new files).  
This step of the packaging process has a second aspect to it as well. There are two ways in 
which members of the packaging team can go about starting the packaging calculus. The 
direct way is by transforming the CAD files into packaging software format and saving them 
in the product data management system (PDM). The result is the same data in two formats in 
the PDM system. The packaging software then calls up the files in the PDM system. The 
indirect way is by transforming the CAD files into packaging software format, then saving 
them in the packaging system (VisMockUp), not the PDM system. Both ways are described in 
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the procedures. The direct way, however, provides a higher degree of control of the process 
because the packaging calculus, run on the central server, leaves a record on the system that 
can be useful. In practice, however, due to unstable IT performance, the packaging team 
prefers using the indirect way.  
 
Step #3: Release of override folder  
The procedures prescribe the release of the override folder and notification of its creation to 
the head of packaging. In practice, as the override folder is not created in the preceding step, it 
can obviously neither be released nor announced.  
 
Step #4: Selection of the individual files to be used in the packaging calculus 
In the fourth step the type of version of the product to be checked is selected (for example, the 
type of engine). Its correct execution is closely linked to the execution of the second step. 
Step #5: Uploading the files into the packaging software  
At this point, there are two possibilities. Either only the files required for a particular 
packaging calculus can be uploaded in the packaging system, or all files for the whole vehicle 
can be uploaded. In the procedures, the latter option is indicated as best practice for virtual 
packaging checks, and it is also what happens in practice. Obviously, as opposed to the partial 
upload, the demands on IT resources are heavier.  
Step #6: Running the packaging calculus and generation of its output 
The calculus itself is run by the software. Having run through the preparation described in the 
previous steps, the action demanded from members of the packaging team at this point is just 
to start the calculation. Packaging team members can choose between three modalities of 
running this session: interferences and anomalies of one (group of) component(s) against one, 
one against all, all against all. The norm on virtual packaging suggests utilizing almost 
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exclusively the modality ‘all against all’. This is precisely what we observed in practice, too: 
no gap was observed.  
 
Step #7: Analysis of anomalies identified 
The output of the analysis is a list of anomalies which, as described above, can be very long. 
In analyzing it, packaging team members therefore use filters. The norm on virtual packaging 
suggests filtering the results according to type, status and result. In practice, we observed that 
packaging team members filtered by sorting the column ‘result’, thus sorting by decreasing 
criticality. Going through this list from the top, they then compare each potential anomaly (the 
list identifies ‘theoretical’ anomalies, indicating where limit values have been violated) with a 
checklist to determine whether the anomaly is likely to be only of minor impact (for instance, 
a minimum distance could not be kept, but the two parts are supposed to touch each other). 
For each line of the table, the result of this check is recorded. It is here that a very small 
difference between the procedures and practice can be noted. Employees do not usually note 
‘p’ (positive) or ‘n’ (negative) outcomes of this confrontation with the checklist, but only 
mark the cases that are problematic.  
Step #8: Following up on the relevant anomalies 
For those anomalies that are considered relevant according to the check in the previous step, 
the packaging team staff needs to individuate the components responsible for the anomaly 
(remember there are always several components involved in producing an anomaly, but the 
cause could be one of them, such as a part that has an uneven surface and rubs against another 
one, causing damage). Once the component that caused the anomaly has been identified, the 
responsible engineer is also identified. Those anomalies that cannot be attributed to one 
component or team member are assigned to the team leader of packaging who then 
determines who is responsible for the anomaly. Furthermore, the packaging team member 
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compiles an anomaly record, in which the anomaly is described. A record of the anomaly is 
also put in the project log-book, and a link to the anomaly record is created in the log-book. 
The responsible team member is then notified by an email with the complete log-book 
attached, which he or she can filter to see the lines that concern him or her. At this point, a 
slight divergence from the procedures can be noted. The procedures prescribe a notification of 
the responsible party in the official record of the vehicle platform. Rather, only the email is 
sent, leaving less on record. The effect is that organizational memory is weakened.  
 
Step #9: Reporting on packaging 
This step consists in compiling indicators on the packaging activity, anomalies found, and so 
on. This phase is usually not carried out completely. 
 
4. Analysis  
 
The research question tackled in this paper is ‘What does employing routines as analytical 
perspective contribute to understanding the behavior of organizations?’ In the analysis 
presented in the previous section, employing organizational routines as an analytical 
perspective has allowed us to do a number of things.   
 
Capture how tasks are actually accomplished in practice (performative level) 
Describing recurrent interaction patterns has turned out to be useful for capturing and 
describing the behavior of organizations as actually carried out. Moreover, two further 
insights relating to this point have emerged from the case study. The recurrent interaction 
patterns not only describe how tasks are actually carried out, but they also capture how tasks 
are usually accomplished. They capture what characterizes the firm (for instance, how 
assembly on a production line takes place at Ford and at Toyota characterizes the ‘Ford way’ 
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or ‘Toyota way’ of producing cars). Recurrent interaction patterns thus contribute a sharp and 
focused descriptive device. In step #1, for instance, describing the recurrent interaction 
patterns to be observed, one realizes that the average on-time delivery rate is almost always 
below 100%. It is typical for the organization we analysed to deliver late, and a whole spate of 
other tasks and routines were triggered by that (one person even had the official task to 
remind the others).  
 Second, this device can make visible what before remained invisible to managers. In 
the packaging process, for instance, management was largely unaware that no systematic 
record was available of which tests that should have been triggered by the list of anomalies 
had actually been carried out (step #7). This is an example of the knowledge-related issues 
that, as we discussed in the beginning, organizational routines can capture. In our example, 
analysing the packaging process in terms of organizational routines reveals that no systematic 
organizational memory is provided for regarding which of the tests that should have been 
triggered by the list of anomalies has actually been carried out (and in particular, in case the 
result was negative, i.e., where there was no problem). In consequence, management only 
perceives the effects (such as interferences), but cannot identify their causes. For instance, in 
our case, engineers ran certain tests but did not leave any trace of a negative test result (the 
problem was not linked to this test). Leaving no trace, however, made the diagnosis later 
much more difficult. Identifying how tasks are accomplished in practice (i.e., by which 
recurrent interaction patterns) therefore contributes at least two important things for 
managers: the description provides a record, an organizational memory and such a 
description, by uncovering aspects that before were hidden from managers’ view, can then be 
the basis of management efforts. There are two ways in which this is important. Knowing 
what usually is the case allows managers to focus their efforts on systematic rather than one-
off events, errors, problems, biases, and performance drivers. Recall that much research 
supports the idea that many processes in organizations are routinized (Cyert and March) so 
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‘acting on’ and influencing those processes, rather than one-off events, should be an important 
focus for managers. (One could even argue that although sometimes strategic decisions and 
adaptations to external shocks need to be taken, such adaptations subsequently will involve 
precisely the adaptation of recurrent interaction patterns, specifying how tasks will be 
accomplished under the new circumstances.) Moreover, if managers are not aware of how 
tasks are usually accomplished in practice, it will be difficult to design and implement 
systematic interventions that will be effective. Instead, their acts will be based on the 
description contained in the rules (i.e., as the tasks should be accomplished), perhaps with a 
huge gap to the actual recurrent interaction patterns that could render managerial action 
incongruent and ineffective.  
 
Identify the ‘governance gap’ by contrasting how tasks are actually carried out in practice 
with how they should be carried out according to the standard operating procedures 
Once a description of how tasks are actually accomplished in practice is available, it can be 
compared with how these tasks should be carried out according to the standard operating 
procedures. The gap that often appears between these two levels can thus be described (see 
figure 4). (Note that if managers do not have a description of how tasks are actually 
accomplished, the gap by d finition, but most likely not in practice, will be zero.)  
 
 
Figure 4: Gap between standard operating procedures and recurrent interaction patterns 
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Being able to describe the gap between the standard operating procedures and the recurrent 
interaction patterns prepares the ground for designing governance mechanisms that can 
address it. A description of organizational behaviour clearly boosts the possibilities for 
designing interventions of organizational change and organizational development that 
improve the structures and mechanisms that govern organizational behaviour. In the 
packaging task, we identified significant gaps in case of the release of CAD files late (step 
#1), how the packaging team used its time (increasingly, running to convince engineers to 
release their files) (step #1), and the (lacking) use of the override folder (step #2).  
 
At this point, one could argue that any description of the actual behaviour allows a 
comparison between it and the rules and procedures to determine whether they were 
implemented faithfully. Note, however, that a description that uses the organizational routines 
framework enables to examine much more than just whether rules were followed or enforced; 
other frameworks (such as business process reengineering) could do this, too. Applying the 
concept of organizational routine in the analysis provides much more than a ‘rule-enforcing’ 
lens. It provides a vantage point that allows the analysis of the behavior of organizations more 
profoundly because the framework systematically takes into account a range of causes of 
behaviour (and performanc  drivers) that is wider than just the design and implementation of 
rules. (For instance, dispositions for helping colleagues catch up delays in the delivery of their 
files to the packaging team might explain why such delays are continuously occurring.) We 
will develop this aspect in more depth in section six.  
 
Identify the performance effects of the recurrent interaction patterns, and of the ‘governance 
gap’ 
Providing a description of recurrent interaction patterns and identifying the governance gap 
provides the possibility of understanding the drivers of particular positive or negative 
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performance effects and linking these effects back to their causes. In packaging, for instance, 
the benefits realized from concurrent engineering are to a considerable extent determined by 
the release of the CAD files and whether they happen on time for all 26 engineering teams.  
The gap in step #1 has the most significant consequences for performance of the 
packaging task: due to a lack of monitoring instruments and of the requirement to 
communicate lacking or delayed release, behaviours result that remain hidden or ‘invisible’ to 
management (which relies on summary indicators or results to follow the process). Moreover, 
the process is structured in such a way that it becomes the responsibility of the packaging 
team leader not only to chase the CAD files, but also to identify the cause of the delayed 
release. This structure confers a hidden de facto power onto the engineers who design 
components, as their (non-)compliance with the release deadline has immense organizational 
consequences. If one or more of the 26 engineering teams do not release their CAD files on 
time (maybe even after postponing the deadline of the virtual packaging by some hours or 
days), the effects are the following: 
• The packaging check as a whole has a much lower significance, as it is based only in 
part on the latest version of all the components. In the extreme, it is close to useless or 
already outdated, as the design teams that have not released their latest set of files will 
most likely have changed the designs over the past two weeks.  
• The teams who did not release their files (on time) will work for another two weeks 
without feedback on whether their designs interfere with any of the other components 
or show any other anomalies. If that should be the result of a later packaging check, 
time will be lost, and it will be much more costly to reverse the design changes made 
in the meantime. Furthermore, there is a risk that anomalies have ‘increased’ in the 
meantime and might now require changes on part of other design teams also. 
• There are important effects on employees as well: tensions between the engineering 
teams and the packaging team, distraction of resources and time of the packaging 
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team, danger of de-legitimation of the packaging check’s results, and the risk of 
demotivation of the packaging team.  
The gap between the procedures and the recurrent interaction patterns in this step has serious 
consequences because of the importance of running packaging checks (their lack might cause 
serious quality problems, for instance) and because of the multiplicator effect of errors and 
deficiencies over the following iterations of the packaging check. In our case, there is not 
even a mechanism to know how many CAD files were not released on time, which aggravates 
the problem. This factor alone could seriously dampen the benefits of concurrent engineering.  
 
Step #2 also creates significant performance effects. Not creating an override folder 
substantially reduces the capability to control the process in real time, of monitoring it over 
the whole life of the project, and to reconstruct it later from organizational memory to learn 
from earlier experience. Without the override folder, it is difficult to know on what basis the 
packaging was carried out (which files were updated and which ones were not). All of these 
details remain invisible to management because they lack profound and detailed knowledge of 
how tasks are carried out in practice (including informal variations on the official procedures, 
which are tolerated and have stabilized). Because packaging team members spend time 
communicating informally with engineering team members to convince them to release the 
latest version rather than use the override folder, the workload shifts to informal 
communication, which is less powerful in terms of organizational memory, remedying 
problems, and lead time. It also involves higher resource requirements, an increased exposure 
to potential sources of error, and possibly an increase in the number of anomalies that are 
identified by the packaging check (some might already have been taken care of in the 
meantime). 
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In step #6, as a consequence of checking interferences in ‘all-against-all’ mode, in 
combination with the choice of uploading the complete files describing the vehicle (step 5), 
the calculus becomes very time- and resource-consuming. It also produces a very long list of 
interferences and anomalies. The effect on the analysis of the anomalies is negative, since the 
packaging team must spend more time going through the list, increasing the rate of error in 
assessing it. 
The description of the recurrent interaction patterns and their gap to standard operating 
procedures thus helps to identify performance effects. Our analysis of step #2 identifies some 
causes for employees choosing to create direct rather than indirect VisMockUp sessions for 
running the packaging calculations. The transfer of all CAD files into the packaging software 
takes a long time because the network is somewhat slow for such purposes. If there are 
problems, the workstations have to be rebooted, taking even more time. Furthermore, a 
software bug on the server does not allow recalling checks that were run in the direct mode. 
Similarly, in step #5, uploading all files into the packaging system, rather than only the files 
needed for the check to be run, enables running checks for things were not planned at the 
outset without leaving the active session and starting a new one (which requires starting again 
from step one). 
Analyzing packaging from an organizational routines perspective thus allows to 
propose concrete corrective measures management should adopt, such as constructing an 
indicator that measures the number of late releases by type of file and team, monitoring this 
indicator closely, drawing conclusions based on this indicator concerning the resources 
allocated to the teams, the behaviour they expose, and their interrelations with other teams, 
and introducing a system of sanctions, also utilizing the same indicators.  
 
5. Discussion: The advantages of the organizational routines concept in analyzing the 
behaviour of organizations 
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Our analysis thus far has documented what we can understand when using the concept of 
organizational routines to analyze how organizations accomplish tasks. We have seen that 
such an analysis goes a long way in understanding the performance generated in 
accomplishing tasks. In the remainder of this section, we argue that this analytical perspective 
can make even more contributions. We further argue those contributions are unique to the 
concept of organizational routines and go beyond the potential contributions of other methods, 
such as business process reengineering (Hammer and Champy 1993).   
 
In a corporate context, the ultimate goal of analyzing processes is to improve their 
performance in accordance with corporate objectives. Performance being the object of 
management efforts, performance indicators have a crucial role for managers’ efforts to 
govern the firm and the processes carried out inside the firm. A key question, however, is how 
directly the performance indicators used are linked to the processes in which performance is 
generated.5 For instance, turnover, pre-tax profits, or lead time for developing a new car 
model are performance measures tha  sum up the influences of many factors. In order to take 
corrective action, they need to be decomposed into performance indicators that can be 
immediately linked to the organizational processes that generated them. In fact, the case 
shows that a set of indicators focused on milestones, cost, and quality, for instance, are limited 
in their capacity to help managers improve performance. Neither does it help management 
make choices on governance mechanisms. Ideally, one would want to identify the precise 
detail that has caused a particular performance effect (such as using a tool in a particular way, 
timing, etc.). Then, governance mechanisms can be designed that address these performance 
drivers directly. The analysis of organizational routines helps to identify precisely those 
performance indicators that are directly linked to the performance drivers of particular 
                                                
5
 Such processes are the part the firm can actively influence; of course there are also exogenous influences such 
as customers, competitors and regulators that cannot be influenced directly by a firm’s managers. 
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processes. Thereby, such an analysis provides managers with the key to designing corrective 
actions on a level of detail that usually remains largely hidden from their view. In the 
packaging case, we have identified some such processes that had very important performance 
implications.   
 
While some of the insights presented above could have been generated by other methods, an 
analysis with organizational routines enables penetration of the next, deeper layer of the 
causes of performance. The key lies in the possibility that the conceptual framework of 
organizational routines can systematically identify the causes of particular performances. As 
opposed to workflow analysis, business process reengineering, and other methods, the 
organizational routines concept provides a framework that is firmly anchored in the social 
sciences. It is more than just a functional technical framework, geared towards increasing 
efficiency. In fact, the organizational routines framework considers organizations as complex 
social systems (cf. Feldman 2000 and 2003, Feldman and Pentland 2003). Describing 
organizational processes with the organizational routines concept therefore establishes a link 
between such descriptions and theories of social dynamics (see, for instance, Lomi and Larsen 
1999), allowing to tap into our knowledge of complex systems.   
 
The analytical perspective of organizational routines used in this article considers multiple 
levels (rules and procedures, recurrent interaction patterns, dispositions), and relates them to 
each other. It therefore provides a multi-level framework that enables asking concrete 
questions about the causes of particular behavior (and its performance effects). It also 
systematically offers several ways to look for causes of certain performance effects: the 
performative aspect (problems with implementing rules, for instance due to interaction and 
group effects, lack of resources, exogenous interference, etc.), the ostensive aspect (problems 
with the formulation of the rules, such as their completeness, ambiguity, etc.), their interaction 
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(for instance, lack of feedback from the performative level on how to update the rules), the 
cognitive processes of the actors who have to interpret the rules, the tools and artefacts actors 
have to use in order to accomplish tasks and perform what the procedures describe, and so on. 
It is crucial to identify several levels and their connections so that interactions, tensions, and 
repercussions between these levels can also be identified. Interaction effects often are a 
powerful causal mechanism in complex social systems and thus hold a key to understanding 
them. Because our approach also identifies reciprocally interdependent tasks as the most 
appropriate ones to analyze, it also focuses this analytical power on a potentially very 
powerful causal mechanism.   
 
In contrast, in an analysis that is limited to identifying inefficiencies in the procedures and 
thus, how the processes are supposed to be carried out, the only possible causes for low 
performance that can be considered systematically are that rules are deficient and need to be 
improved. Other possible causes of low performance are not systematically captured by the 
framework and therefore cannot be addressed by an analyst who uses such a framework (at 
least not as part of a systematic analysis, i.e., only ad hoc). Opposed to such methods, the 
organizational routines perspective  is connected to different subfields in the social sciences 
and therefore draws on the disciplinary knowledge in these fields since the constructs at each 
level (recurrent behavior patterns, rules, dispositions) are reflected in different fields of the 
social sciences, such as in sociology, psychology, or political science. We can therefore draw 
on the knowledge of, for instance, rules and their interaction with stable behavior patterns in 
the aforementioned disciplines while staying in the same framework (rather than having a 
description of a technical process and a description of, say, cultural characteristics that do not 
really fit in the same framework and thus stand side by side unconnected). Note also that 
drawing on underlying knowledge from multiple disciplines should improve understanding 
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and explanatory power, allowing the managerial implications of the analysis to be based on 
the same disciplinary knowledge.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Using organizational routines as analytical perspective to examine how the virtual packaging 
task is carried out at the engineering centre has been helpful in uncovering important details 
that would otherwise have remained largely hidden to management, particularly in contrasting 
how tasks are carried out in practice with how they should be carried out. On the basis of the 
‘governance gap’ analysis, we were able to identify the causes of certain performance effects. 
The examples are rich and clearly illustrate how this approach identifies concrete performance 
drivers that summary measures often do not provide. This analysis thus provides concrete 
levers for designing corrective measures that attack the problem directly and enable 
implementing focused change by designing interventions that immediately address the drivers 
of performance effects. It shifts emphasis from a focus on the planned and/or documented 
process to what actually happens. In so doing, it specifies the object of management efforts 
more precisely. Our analysis was received positively by the management of the company we 
observed, which was convinced of the analysis and its conclusions6. Thanks to the 
‘governance gap’ analysis and the ability to link performance outcomes to their concrete 
causes, we were even able to generate simulations of the outcomes of different set-ups of one 
step or another in the “packaging” process. The packaging case therefore demonstrates the 
usefulness of analyzing organizational behaviour by using organizational routines as 
analytical perspective and in their providing a basis for designing governance structures that 
allow management to guide organizational change and organizational development.  
 
                                                
6
 Perhaps most surprising of all, senior managers, all of them engineers, were also convinced of using 
organizational routines as analytical perspective. 
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One of the principal contributions of this paper is to provide empirical data on what a routine 
is. In this respect, several conclusions stand out beyond those already discussed in the 
previous section. Regarding the definition and operationalization of organizational routines, 
the analysis has shown that, in particular, the twin focus on the standard operating procedures 
and the recurrent interaction patterns is fruitful for generating interesting insights and for 
contributing to our understanding of organizational behavior. In theoretical terms, 
organizational routines as analytical perspective offer a structured perspective on 
organizational behavior. Rules and procedures, and recurrent interaction patterns are clearly 
on different levels. Rules cannot be reduced to action, nor can action be reduced to rules. As 
Feldman and Pentland insist, human agency always mediates between rules and their 
expression in action, e.g. by interpretation. The implications are multiple, and they are all 
important for future empirical and conceptual work in understanding the behavior of 
organizations. To start with, it seems helpful for analysis to use an analytical perspective  that 
offers several dimensions for analysis as well as captures the interactions between those 
dimensions. As already mentioned, a framework for developing hypotheses, for instance, on 
the causes of certain performance implications is provided. For example, such a framework 
allows us to ask whether the problem is on the level of the rules, their enforcement, the 
supporting infrastructure, and so on. Second, the levels the concept of organizational routines 
points to are both empirically and theoretically meaningful. They are empirically meaningful 
because organizations are replete with standard operating procedures, norms, rules, and the 
like. They are common in organizations, they are obvious, and most of the time, they are not 
difficult to identify (for instance, in our case, there were documents called ‘procedures’ and 
‘norms’). They are theoretically meaningful because rules, recurrent interaction patterns, 
artefacts and so on figure in theories in different social sciences. The link to theories on the 
interpretation of rules (Reynaud 1996) or to theories about learning curves is straight (cf. 
Adler and Clark 1991, Adler et al. 1999). Note also that the dimensions we employ in the 
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analysis do not fit to just one particular theoretical framework (such as for instance learning 
curves). Such a perspective also links to theories, for instance, on capabilities, on their 
replication, on organizational memory, in strategic management, organization theory, and 
many others. Furthermore, it allows us to tap into underlying disciplinary knowledge, such as 
sociology, psychology, and so on. No doubt, that is a very helpful characteristic for 
understanding the behavior of organizations or, for that purpose, any social phenomenon.  
 As mentioned, the board of directors we addressed was convinced of the analysis. The 
CEO, however, also presented us with the question: ‘How do I know whether I can generalize 
these insights to other processes in my firm?’ This question addresses the limits of the 
analysis of organizational routines if they are understood as recurrent interaction patterns (and 
considered alongside standard operating procedures). While such an analysis provides insight 
on the particular task analyzed, generalizing such insight will, however, be subject to limits.7 
Even where a large number of processes are analyzed, these limits will not go away. For a 
different phase of the product development process, say, concept development, very different 
details might turn out to matter. The CEO’s question, therefore, not only captures a crucial 
issue about the usefulness of the organizational routines concept in empirical research, but 
also identifies a substantial conceptual issue: Does the limited generalizability of results of an 
empirical analysis of organizational routines mean the concept provides nothing but a 
‘magnifying glass’ for analyzing business processes, even though it is appealing in theory? 
The problem behind the question of the generalizability8 of insights from an empirical 
analysis is the basis on which such generalization can be made. In order to generalize about 
behavior and its expression, it is necessary to reach the level of causes of espoused behavior. 
Recurrent interaction patterns alone, for instance, obviously describe behavior that is 
                                                
7
 After all, the causes of inefficiencies identified in such an analysis are quite particular details, such as choosing 
to upload all files rather than only the ones required, to convert files into another format on one system rather 
than another, and so on. 
8
 Our understanding of ‘generalizing’ always takes into account the context. For instance, generalizing within the 
context of a business unit, a firm, an industry and so on. 
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exhibited and therefore cannot also describe its causes at the same time.9 Therefore, we find 
that in future research on organizational routines and behavior, we need to attempt to create a 
close match between empirical constructs on the one hand and a theoretical framework on the 
other hand that has something to say on the causes of espoused behavior. While that is not at 
all surprising, that is not always what one can find in the literature so far.  
 The empirical analysis has shown that organizational routines focus on phenomena of 
crucial interest to students of organizations since focusing on reciprocally interdependent 
tasks examines tasks that pose crucial organizational challenges. As remarked recently in 
organization literature, it is not always easy to pick units of analysis that capture the 
phenomenon under inquiry in a way that it is fruitful for an analysis by organization scholars 
(Heath and Sitkin 2001, Hackman 2003). The indications from our empirical analysis are 
therefore promising. 
Finally, our empirical analysis makes an important contribution to the conceptual 
discussion of how to define an organizational routine: precisely the multi-level perspective 
that the organizational routines concept points to has turned out to be of great help for the 
empirical analysis and drawing conclusions from it. The most recent addition, the level of 
dispositions, points to a fruitful avenue to explore in the future. Because dispositions clearly 
refer to the causes of espoused behavior (Hodgson 2008, Knudsen 2008) and do so more 
immediately than rules or standard operating procedures, they seem to hold yet more potential 
for the concept of organizational routines as perspective in analyzing organizations.  
 
Bibliography 
 
Adler, PS, Clark, KB, 1991. Behind the learning curve: A sketch of the learning process. 
Management Science 37, 267-281. 
 
                                                
9
 We refer to the same point of time here. We do not want to imply that behavior in a previous time step can not 
influence, or cause or trigger, behavior in a subsequent time step.  
Page 35 of 37
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
  
 35 
Adler, PS, Goldoftas, B,  Levine, DI, 1999. Flexibility versus efficiency? A case study of 
model changovers in the Toyota production system. Organization Science 10, 43-68. 
 
Argote, L, Epple, D, 1990. Learning curves in manufacturing. Science 247, 920-924.  
 
Barley, SR, Kunda, G, 2001. Bringing work back in. Organization Science 12, 76-95. 
 
Becker, MC, 2004. Organizational routines: A review of the literature. Industrial and 
Corporate Change 13, 643-678. 
 
Becker, MC, Lazaric, N, Nelson, RR, Winter, SG, 2005. Applying organizational routines in 
understanding organizational change. Industrial and Corporate Change, 14, 775-791. 
 
Cohen, M, Bacdayan, P, 1994. Organizational routines are stored as procedural memory: 
Evidence from a laboratory study. Organization Science 5, 554-568. 
 
Cyert, RM, March, JG, 1963 [1992]. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Dosi, G, Nelson, RR, Winter, SG, 2000. Introduction: The nature and dynamics of 
organisational capabilities. In: Dosi, G, Nelson, RR, Winter, SG (Eds.). The Nature and 
Dynamics of Organisational Capabilities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-22. 
 
Edmondson, AC, Bohmer, RM, Pisano, GP, 2001. Disrupted routines: Team learning and new 
technology implementation in hospitals. Administrative Science Quarterly 46, 685-716. 
 
Eisenhardt, KM, 1989. Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management 
Review 14, 532-550. 
 
Eisenhardt, K. M. and Graebner, M. E. (2007). ‘Theory building from cases: opportunities 
and challenges’, Academy of Management Journal, 50/1: 25-32. 
 
Feldman, MS, 2000. Organizational routines as a source of continuous change. Organization 
Science 11, 611-629. 
 
Feldman, MS, 2003. A performative perspective on stability and change in organizational 
routines. Industrial and Corporate Change 12, 727-752. 
 
Feldman, MS, Pentland, BT, 2003. Reconceptualizing organizational routines as a source of 
flexibility and change. Administrative Science Quarterly 48, 94-118. 
 
Hackman, JR, 2003. Learning more by crossing levels: evidence from airplanes, hospitals, 
and orchestras. Journal of Organizational Behavior 24, 905–922 
 
Hammer, M, Champy, J, 1993. Reengineering the Corporation – A Manifesto for Business 
Revolution. New York: Harper-Collins 
 
Heath, C, Sitkin, SB, 2001. Big-B versus Big-O: What is organizational about organizational 
behavior? Journal of Organizational Behavior 22, 43-58. 
 
Hodgson, GM, 2008 forthcoming. The Concept of a Routine. Becker, MC, ed, Handbook of 
Organizational Routines. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar  
Page 36 of 37
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
  
 36 
 
Hodgson, GM, 2004. Reclaiming habit for institutional economics. Journal of Economic 
Psychology 25, 651–660. 
 
Hodgson, GM, Knudsen, T, 2004a. The firm as an interactor: Firms as vehicles for habits and 
routines. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 14, 281-307. 
 
Hodgson, GM, Knudsen, T, 2004b. The complex evolution of a simple traffic convention: 
The functions and implications of habit. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 54, 
19-47. 
 
Hutchins, E, 1991. Organizing work by adaptation. Organization Science 2, 14-39. 
 
Knott, AM, McKelvey, W, 1999. Nirvana efficiency: A comparative test of residual claims 
and routines. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 38, 365-383. 
 
Knudsen, T, 2008 forthcoming. Organizational Routines in Evolutionary Theory. Becker, 
MC, ed, Handbook of Organizational Routines. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar  
 
Leidner, R, 1993. Fast Food, Fast Talk – Service Work and the Routinization of Everyday 
Life. Berkeley: University of California Press 
 
Lomi, A, Larsen, ER, 1999. Evolutionary Models of Local Interaction – A Computational 
Perspective. McKelvey, W, Baum, JAC (Eds.). Variations in Organization Science. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage, 255-278 
 
March, JG, Simon, HA, 1958 [1993]. Organizations. Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
Miles, MB, Huberman, AM, 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook, 2nd 
edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Narduzzo, A, Rocco, E, Warglien, M. 2000. Talking about routines in the field. In: Dosi , G, 
Nelson, RR, Winter, SG (Eds.). The Nature and Dynamics of Organizational Capabilities. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 27-50. 
 
Nelson, RR, Winter, SG, 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge: 
Belknap Press/Harvard University Press. 
 
Orlikowski, WJ, 2000. Using technology and constituting structures: A practice lens for 
studying technology in organizations. Organization Science 11, 404-428. 
Penrose, E, 1959 [1995]. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Pentland, BT, 1995. Grammatical models of organizational processes. Organization Science 
6, 541-556. 
 
Pentland, BT, 2003a. Conceptualizing and measuring variety in the execution of 
organizational work processes. Management Science 49, 857-870. 
 
Page 37 of 37
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
  
 37 
Pentland, BT, 2003b. Sequential variety in work processes. Organization Science 14, 528-
540. 
 
Pentland, BT, Rueter, H, 1994. Organisational routines as grammars of action, Administrative 
Sciences Quarterly 39, 484-510. 
 
Pettigrew, AM, 1990. Longitudinal field research on change: Theory and practice. 
Organization Science 1, 267-292. 
 
Reynaud, B, 1996. Types of rules, interpretation and collective dynamics: Reflections on the 
introduction of a salary rule in a maintenance workshop. Industrial and Corporate Change 5, 
699-721. 
 
Siggelkow, N. (2007). ‘Persuasion with case studies’, Academy of Management Journal, 
50/1: 20-24. 
 
Simon, HA, 1947 [1997]. Administrative Behaviour. New York: Free Press. 
 
Szulanski, G, Winter, SG, 2002. Getting it right the second time. Harvard Business Review 
80/1: 62-71. 
 
Thompson, JD, 1967. Organizations in Action – Social Science Bases of Administrative 
Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Winter, SG, Szulanski, G, 2001. Replication as strategy. Organization Science 12, 730-743. 
 
Yin, RK, 1994. Case Study Research, 2nd edition. London: Sage. 
 
Zollo, M. and Winter, S. (2002). ‘Deliberate Learning and the Evolution of Dynamic 
Capabilities’, Organization Science, 13/3: 339-35. 
 
